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ABSTRACT 
Given the recent increase in charter schools as an alternative to the traditional public 
education system, this Article explores the legal status and position of charter 
schools. Charter schools exhibit many characteristics of private schools, particularly 
in terms of management, but also retain many public school features. Thus, this 
Article explores areas of the law where charter schools were either classified as 
public or private in terms of state statutes or regulations, discussing recent and some 
pending litigation. First, this Article discusses whether charter schools, charter 
school boards and officials, or educational management organizations which manage 
charter schools are entitled to governmental immunity, thus classifying them as 
public entities. Second, this Article examines the interplay between charter schools, 
their boards, and their management organizations and whether they are subject to 
public accountability laws, as their public school counterparts are. Third, this Article 
surveys whether charter schools are subject to state prevailing wage statutes. Fourth, 
this Article examines whether charter schools are required to follow the same student 
expulsion requirements as public schools. This Article proceeds to tally the results of 
this litigation, discussing both whether charter schools are subject to the same laws 
and regulations as public schools in their districts and whether charter schools and 
their officials are public entities under the law, and thus subject to the same rules 
governing the action of public officials. This Article concludes that often times, this 
distinction is not clear in state statutory requirements as they currently stand, and that 
legislators should take care in drafting charter school legislation, so that charter 
schools have a clear set of rules to follow and courts have a clear set of rules to apply 
in litigation. The status quo is particularly troubling with regard to student 
disciplinary issues and educational management organizations’ fiduciary obligations, 
and this Article urges legislators to address these issues. 
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I: INTRODUCTION 
ince 1991, forty-two states and the District of Columbia have 
enacted legislation for charter schools.
1
 In the 2012-13 school 
year, there were more than 6,000 charter schools,
2
 serving almost 2.3 
million students.
3
 While charter schools are generally characterized as 
“public schools,” courts have had a difficult time determining their 
legal status because they exhibit both public and private 
characteristics.
4
 For example, New York’s charter school statute 
defines a charter school as an “independent and autonomous public 
school, except as otherwise provided in [the charter school statute], 
and a political subdivision having boundaries coterminous with the 
school district or community school district in which the charter school 
is located.”
5
 However, self-appointed boards of trustees, instead of 
governmental appointees, “have final authority for policy and 
operational decisions of the school.”
6
 Further, charter schools are 
“exempt from all other state and local laws, rules, regulations or 
policies governing public or private schools, boards of education, 
school districts and political subdivisions, including those relating to 
school personnel and students, except as specifically provided in the 
school’s charter or [the charter school statute].”
7
 
Several law review articles have examined the legal status of 
charter schools pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute that 
establishes a cause of action for deprivations of federal constitutional 
                                                        
1
 Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, Fast Facts, http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp
?id=30 (noting that the only states not to pass legislation are Alabama, 
Kentucky, Montana, Nebraska, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and 
West Virginia). 
2
 Nat’l All. of Pub. Charter Schs. Dashboard, Total Number of Schools, 
http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/schools/page/overview/year/2013 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
3
 Nat’l All. of Pub. Charter Schs. Dashboard, Total Number of Students, 
http://dashboard.publiccharters.org/dashboard/students/page/overview/year/2013 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
4
 New York Charter Ass’n v. Smith, 940 N.E.2d 522, 525 (2010). 
5
 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 2853(1)(c) (McKinney 2014). 
6
 Id. § 2853(1)(f). 
7
 Id. § 2854(1)(b). 
S 
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and statutory rights under the color of state law.
8
 Most law review 
articles that have analyzed whether charter schools are public under 
state law focus on state constitutions.
9
 To our knowledge, only one law 
review article has examined how courts have treated the legal status of 
charter schools under state statutes.
10
 We address this gap by 
                                                        
8
 See, e.g., Bradley T. French, Comment, Charter Schools: Are For-Profit 
Companies Contracting for State Actor Status, 83 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 251 
(2006); Justin M. Goldstein, Note, Exploring “Unchartered” Territory: An 
Analysis of Charter Schools and the Applicability of the U.S. Constitution, 7 S. 
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 133 (1998); Preston C. Green III et al., Charter Schools, 
Students of Color and the State Action Doctrine: Are the Rights of Students of 
Color Sufficiently Protected, 18 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 253 
(2012); Fiona M. Greaves & Preston C. Green III, The Legal Issues Surrounding 
Partnerships between Charter Schools and For-Profit Management Companies, 
206 ED. L. REP. 27 (2006); Maren Hulden, Note, Charting a Course to State 
Action: Charter Schools and § 1983, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1244 (2011); 
Catherine LoTempio, Comment, It’s Time to Try Something New: Why Old 
Precedent Does Not Suit Charter Schools in the Search for State Actor Status, 
47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 435 (2012); Aaron Saiger, Charter Schools, The 
Establishment Clause, and the Neoliberal Turn in Public Education, 34 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1163 (2013); Alyssa M. Simon, “Race” to the Bottom?: 
Addressing Student Body Diversity in Charter Schools after Parents Involved, 
10 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 399 (2011); Jason Lance Wren, Note, Charter Schools: 
Public or Private? An Application of the Fourteenth Amendment’s State Action 
Doctrine to These Innovative Schools, 19 REV. LITIG. 135 (2000). 
9
 See, e.g., L.K. Beale, Note & Comment, Charter Schools, Common Schools and 
the Washington State Constitution, 72 WASH. L. REV. 535 (1997); Andrew Broy, 
Comment, Charter Schools and Education Reform: How State Constitutional 
Challenges Will Alter Charter School Legislation, 79 N.C. L. REV. 493 (2001); 
Anne Marie Deprey, Case Note, Utah School Board Association v. Utah State 
Board of Education: The Constitutionality of Utah Charter Schools, 5 J.L. FAM. 
STUD. 149 (2003); Preston C. Green III, Are Charter Schools Constitutional?: 
Council of Organizations and Other for Education about Parochiaid v. Governor, 
125 ED. L. REP. 1 (1998); William Haft, Charter Schools and the Nineteenth 
Century Corporation: A Match Made in the Public Interest?, 30 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 
1023 (1998); Nathaniel J. McDonald, Note, Ohio Charter Schools and 
Educational Privatization: Undermining the Legacy of the State Constitution’s 
Common School Approach, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 467 (2006); Robert J. Martin, 
Charting the Court Challenges to Charter Schools, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 43 
(2004); Karla A. Turekian, Traversing the Minefields of Education Reform: The 
Legality of Charter Schools, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1365 (1997). 
10
 Ralph D. Mawdsley, Charter Schools and Charter School Officials; Have States 
Adequately Defined the Status and Responsibilities of These Schools?, 269 ED. 
LAW REP. 443 (2011). 
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examining how courts have treated the hybrid nature of charter schools 
in a variety of state statutory contexts. 
Part II of this Article examines whether charter schools, charter 
school officials, and the educational management organizations 
(EMOs) that provide services to charter schools are entitled to 
governmental immunity. Part III examines how courts have applied 
public accountability laws to charter schools, charter school officials, 
and EMOs. Part IV examines whether charter schools are public 
entities subject to prevailing wage statutes. Part V analyzes whether 
charter schools are public schools that must follow student expulsion 
requirements. Part VI provides a tally of these cases in terms of 
whether: (1) charter schools and EMOs are subject to the same rules as 
public schools and (2) charter school officials are governmental agents 
subject to the same rules as other public officials. The final part 
identifies cases that raise concerns that legislatures should address 
through statutory amendments. 
II: GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
Because of their status as governmental agencies, public schools 
are generally immune from tort liability in connection with their 
operations, unless legislative or constitutional provisions impose 
liability.
11
 In addition, the doctrine of qualified immunity protects 
public school teachers and administrators from liability in taking 
discretionary action, unless they have committed a willful or malicious 
wrong.
12
 Charter schools, charter school employees, and EMOs have 
sought immunity from litigation by asserting that they are 
governmental agencies or political subdivisions. This part summarizes 
the case law on this topic. 
A. Charter Schools 
The courts of Colorado and Pennsylvania have concluded that 
charter schools are entitled to governmental immunity under state 
statutes. In the Colorado case, King v. United States, the owners of 
property destroyed by a fire set by charter school students brought 
action in federal district court against the charter school claiming 
                                                        
11
 Allan E. Korpela, Annotation, Modern Status of Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity 
as Applied to Public Schools and Institutions of Higher Learning, 33 A.L.R.3d 
703 (1970). 
12
 Mary A. Lentz, § 5:33 Official Immunity, LENTZ SCHOOL SEC. (2013). 
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negligence and other state law claims.
13
 The charter school moved to 
dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction 
under Federal Rules of Procedure 12(b)(1).
14
 The school asserted that 
it was a “public entity” under the Colorado Governmental Immunity 
Act (CGIA) and was thus entitled to immunity.
15
 The CGIA defines a 
“public entity” as: 
the state, county, city and county, municipality, school district, 
special improvement district, and every other kind of district, 
agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof organized 
pursuant to law and any separate entity created by 
intergovernmental contract or cooperation only between or among 
the state, county, city and county, municipality, school district, 
special improvement district, and every other kind of district, 
agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision thereof.
16
 
The district court looked at whether the charter school was an 
“agency, instrumentality, or political subdivision” of the school district 
in which it was located.
17
 Because the CGIA failed to define “agency,” 
“instrumentality,” or “political subdivision,” the court analyzed the 
plain meaning of these terms.
18
 It found that “agency” was defined as 
“‘[t]he relation created by express or implied contract or by law 
whereby one party delegates the transaction of some lawful business 
with more or less discretionary power to another.’”
19
 The court 
observed that “instrumentality” was defined as “‘[s]omething by which 
an end is achieved; a means medium, or agency.’”
20
 “Political 
subdivision” was defined as “‘[a] division of the state made by proper 
authorities thereof, acting within their constitutional powers, for 
purposes of carrying out a portion of those functions of state which by 
                                                        
13
 King v. United States, 53 F.Supp.2d 1056 (D.Colo. 1999); rev’d, in part, on 
other grounds, 301 F.3d 1270 (10th Cir. 2002). 
14
 King, 53 F.Supp.2d at 1064. 
15
 Id. The Colorado Government Immunity Act (CGIA) provides that “[a] public 
entity shall be immune from liability in all claims for injury which lie in tort or 
could lie in tort . . . except as provided otherwise in this section.” COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 24-10-106(1) (2014). 
16
 COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-10-103(5) (2014). 
17




 Id. at 1065-66 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 62 (6th ed. 1990)). 
20
 Id. at 1066 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 801 (6th ed. 1990)). 
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The Court in King then examined the language of the Colorado 
Charter Schools Act (CSA) to determine whether the charter school 
satisfied the definition of agency, instrumentality, or subdivision.
22
 It 
noted that the overarching goal of the CSA was to encourage the 
development of flexible, innovative educational opportunities for 
parents, students, teachers, and community members “within the 
public school system.”
23
 This language showed that the state had 
clearly delegated authority to the charter school “to conduct the 
business of educating public school pupils.”
24
 Moreover, the statute 
authorized the charter school “to operate quasi-independently from the 
school district, and allow[ed] the charter school to contract with the 
school district to obtain this agency power.”
25
 
The court rejected the assertion that the charter school was too 
autonomous to be an agency or instrumentality of the school district. 
The CSA held charter schools accountable to local boards of education 
with respect to “applicable laws and charter provisions.”
26
 Article IX, 
§ 15 of the state constitution also held charter schools accountable by 
placing control of public instruction in the hands of local boards of 
education.
27
 The court disagreed with the plaintiffs’ assertion that the 
charter school was merely a licensee of the district instead of a public 
entity.
28
 The CSA repeatedly declared that charter schools operated 
within the public school system.
29
 Further, the term “charter,” which 
meant “an instrument in writing from the sovereign power of the 
state,” clearly showed that the charter school was not a licensee.
30
 
Moreover, the King Court dismissed the argument that the charter 
school was not entitled to immunity because it operated like a private 
                                                        
21
 Id. (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1159 (6th ed. 1990)). 
22
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school instead of a public school.
31
 Although the CSA permitted an 
elected board to govern the school, local and state boards of education 
had ultimate authority.
32
 The court was not swayed by the argument 
that the charter school was a private entity because it was not fully 
funded by the school district.
33
 The school district provided eighty-five 
percent of the charter school’s operating expenses as well as 
“unreimbursable human resources,” such as “business services, payroll 
services, risk management services, insurance coverage, and legal 
services.”
34
 Indeed, the amount of the charter school’s expenses “not 
provided directly by the School District or indirectly from the State of 
Colorado or state taxpayers [was] minimal compared to the amount 
provided directly or indirectly from state sources.”
35
 
In addition, the court rejected the argument that the charter school 
operated like a private school because it contracted with the school 
district and entered into employment contracts with its teachers. While 
the CSA authorized the school to contract for services, prepare its 
budget and handle its own personnel affairs, “a charter school’s 
authority is subject to a charter school application which must be 




Finally, the court refused to find that the charter school was a 
private entity because of its nonprofit corporate status.
37
 While it was 
true that a nonprofit corporation could sue or be sued under state law, 
the plain language of the CSA “provide[s] that a charter school’s 
nonprofit corporate status does not affect its status as a public school 
for any purposes pursuant to Colorado law.”
38
 
In the Pennsylvania case, Warner v. Lawrence, a student brought a 
negligence claim against a charter school for injuries that he had 
received while on school grounds.
39
 The charter school moved for 
summary judgment on the grounds that the Pennsylvania Charter 


















 Warner v. Lawrence, 900 A.2d 980, 982 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2006). 
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School Law (CSL) entitled the school to immunity under the Tort 
Claims Act in the same fashion as political subdivisions and local 
agencies.
40




On appeal, the Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the 
lower court in granting summary judgment for the charter school.
42
 It 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim that the provisions of the charter school 
law were inconsistent because one section stated that charter schools 
could sue and be sued while another section limited liability solely to 
the charter school and its board of trustees.
43
 The court reasoned that, 
when read together, the first provision explained how charter schools 
could be sued while the second section identified who at the charter 
school could be sued.
44
 Thus, these provisions did not contradict each 
other.
45
 Instead, these provisions supported the legislature’s goal of 
ensuring that charter schools were treated in the same manner as 
political subdivisions and local agencies in tort actions, while also 
protecting local school board directors from liability for the actions of 
the charter school or its board of trustees.
46
 
The court also denied the argument that the legislature’s grant of 
immunity to charter schools under the Tort Claims Act violated the 
Open Courts Provision of the state constitution,
47
 which provided that 
“every man for an injury done him . . . shall have remedy by due 
course of law.”
48
 The plaintiff pointed out that private individuals and 
non-sectarian, non-profit corporations could establish charter 
schools.
49
 Therefore, the plaintiff continued, granting immunity to 
“disparate individuals and entities who are given wide powers” would 








 Id. at 982-83. 
42
 Id. at 989. 
43
 Id at 984. 
44
 Id at 984-85. 
45




 Id. at 988-89. 
48
 PA. CONST. Art. I, § 11. 
49
 Warner, 980 A.2d at 985. 
50
 Id. 
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The court countered that, on several occasions, the judiciary had 
held that the legislature could limit liability, as long as the entity had 
the characteristics of a political subdivision or local agency.
51
 The 
court then concluded that charter schools had these traits.
52
 The local 
school board exercised considerable control over the existence of 
charter schools because the board approved charter school 
applications.
53
 Also, charter schools were subject to other statutes that 
applied to other public schools and received funding through tax 
dollars from local school districts.
54
 Further, charter schools were 
required to participate in the state assessment program, were subject to 




While the Colorado and Pennsylvania courts held that charter 
schools were entitled to governmental immunity, the Supreme Court of 
California found that charter schools were not immune. In Wells v. 
One2One Learning Foundation, charter school students, and their 
parents and guardians, claimed that several charter schools, their 
operators, and their chartering districts violated the state’s false claim 
and unfair competition statutes by failing to provide their students with 
promised distance learning through the Internet.
56
 Instead, the 
plaintiffs asserted that the charter schools existed only to enable the 
schools and districts to collect public educational funding from the 
state in a fraudulent manner.
57
 
The issue in this case was whether any of the defendants were 
“persons” who could be sued under the state’s false claims and unfair 
competition statutes.
58
 The California False Claims Act (CFCA) 
provided that “[a]ny person who . . . [k]nowingly presents or causes to 
be presented to . . . the state or . . . any political subdivision thereof a 
false claim for payment or approval . . . shall be liable to the state or 
subdivision for three times the amount of damages” sustained by the 
                                                        
51
 Id. at 986-88. 
52












 Id. at 228-29. 
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state or political subdivision.
59
 The statute’s definition of “person” 
included “any natural person, corporation, firm, association, 
organization, partnership, limited liability company, business, or 
trust.”
60
 California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL) provided relief 
by civil litigation against “[a]ny person who engages, has engaged, or 
proposed to engage in unfair competition.”
61
 This statute defined the 
term “person” to include “natural persons, corporations, firms, 




The state’s court of appeal ruled that the school districts, charter 
schools, and the charter operators were “persons” under the CFCA; 
thus, all were exposed to liability.
63
 The appellate court also held that 
the charter school defendants were “persons” under the UCL, and 
were, therefore, subject to liability.
64
 Conversely, the appellate court 




On appeal to the Supreme Court of California, the school districts, 
charter schools, and their operators challenged the lower court’s 
conclusion that they were subject to liability under the CFCA.
66
 The 
students, parents, and guardians urged the Supreme Court to consider 
the additional issue of whether the private non-profit corporations 
operating charter schools were defined as persons by the UCL
67
 
The state supreme court ruled that school districts were not 
considered “persons” under the CFCA, and were thus immune.
68
 It 
observed that the words and phrases used to define “persons” were 
most commonly connected with private individuals and entities.
69
 
Also, the legislature had demonstrated in other contexts that it knew 
how to include public entities in the definition of “persons” when it 
                                                        
59
 Id. at 234 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
60
 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
61
 Id. (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17203 (West 2004)). 
62
 Id. at 236 (quoting Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code, §17201 (West 2004)). 
63










 Id. at 242. 
69
 Id. at 236. 
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wished to do so.
70
 The legislative history of the statute also showed 
that school districts were not “persons” under the statute.
71
 The 
original bill included “district, county, city, the state, and any of the 
agencies and political subdivisions of these entities” as covered 
“persons.”
72
 However, “[a] subsequent amendment to the bill excised 
the references to governmental entities, and the definition of ‘person’ 
was changed to the form finally adopted.”
73
 This deletion prior to the 
passage of the statute signified that the legislature intended to exclude 
school districts from civil liability.
74
 
By contrast, the court ruled that charter schools were “persons” 
who could be liable under the CFCA.
75
 The court observed that the 
act’s definition of “persons,” included “corporations,” “limited 
liability companies,” “organizations” and “associations.”
76
 Four of the 
charter school defendants involved in the complaint were 
corporations.
77
 While a fifth charter school was not itself a 
corporation, corporations operated it. Consequently, that charter school 




The court was not swayed by the argument that the charter schools 
were entitled to immunity under the CFCA because the charter school 
law declared that charter schools were part of the public school 
system.
79
 Although charter schools were part of the school system, the 
school system did not operate these schools.
80
 Rather, non-profit 
corporations, which had substantial freedom from public school 
bureaucracy and financial oversight, ran charter schools.
81
 The 
legislature designed the CFCA “to help the government recover public 




 Id. at 237. 
72
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funds from outside entities with which it deals.”
82
 Thus, the court 
reasoned, “[t]he statutory purpose is equally served by applying the 
CFCA to the independent corporations that receive public monies 
under the [charter school law] to operate schools at issue here on 
behalf of the public education system.”
83
 
The court also determined that the application of the CFCA to 
charter school operators did not infringe upon the government’s 
sovereign power over education.
84
 School districts had the primary 
responsibility for operating the state’s system of education.
85
 It 
followed that “[t]he districts’ continuing financial ability to carry out 
this mission at basic levels of adequacy” was critical in carrying out 
the state’s constitutional educational obligation.
86
 Accordingly, the 
legislature did not intend to undermine the ability to perform its 
constitutional duty by subjecting public school districts to the severe 
monetary sanctions of the CFCA.
87
 
By contrast, the charter school law did not assign a similar 
obligation to charter school operators.
88
 Charter schools served terms 
of up to five years, subject to renewal, “dependent upon satisfaction of 
statutory requirements.”
89
 If a charter school ceased to exist, the public 
schools in that same district would take over the educational 
responsibility of its students, and the funding for those students would 
revert to the district.
90
 Thus, the monetary remedies imposed by the 
statute on the charter school defendants “cannot be said to infringe the 
exercise of the sovereign power over public education.”
91
 For similar 
reasons, the court concluded that charter schools were “persons” under 
the UCL, and were thus not immune from liability under this statute.
92
 
                                                        
82


















 Id. at 131. 
92
 Id. at 245-46. In Knapp v. Palisades Charter High Sch., 53 Cal.Rptr. 182 
(Cal.App. 2007), a prospective high school student sued a charter school on the 
grounds of sexual harassment and intentional infliction of emotion distress. The 
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B. Charter School Boards and Board Members 
In Hope Academy Broadway Campus v. Integrated Consulting and 
Management, the Court of Appeals of Ohio addressed whether charter 
school boards and individual board members were entitled to 
governmental immunity.
93
 In this case, the boards of nineteen charter 
schools contracted with Integrated Consulting and Management, LLC 
(ICM), for security services.
94
 Shortly after contracting with ICM, the 
boards executed consulting agreements with Community Educational 
Partnerships, LLC (CEP) for a variety of educational services.
95
 The 
contract with ICM prohibited that corporation from contracting with 
any other service provider hired by the schools.
96
 At the time of the 
execution of the contracts, Joe Fouche, the owner of ICM and Angela 




Because of financial and billing concerns, the boards tried to 
renegotiate the security agreement with ICM.
98
 When those 
negotiations failed, the boards terminated the contracts with both ICM 
and CEP “because board members had discovered that ICM had a 
business relationship with CEP” in violation of ICM’s contract.
99
 
Additionally, a board member, James Haynes, informed the owner of 
ICM that the hiding of the relationship indicated the possibility of 
fraudulent behavior on the part of ICM and CEP.
100
 
ICM sued the boards for breach of contract. ICM also claimed that 
the boards as entities, Haynes and another board member, James 
                                                                                                                                   
charter school moved for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiff had 
failed to satisfy the claim presentation requirements of the state tort claims act. 
The California Court of Appeal used the analysis in Wells to conclude that a 
charter school was not a “public entity” within the meaning of the state tort 
claims act. Thus, the plaintiff was not required to satisfy the presentation 
requirements. 
93
 Hope Acad. Broadway Campus v. Integrated Consulting & Mgmt., Nos. 96100, 
96101, 2011 WL 6780186, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 22, 2011). 
94
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Stubbs, as individuals, tortuously interfered with the corporation’s 
contracts.
101
 The boards, Haynes, and Stubbs moved for summary 
judgment on the grounds that they were immune from liability under 
the Political Subdivision Tort Liability Act (PSTLA).
102
 They also 
moved for partial summary judgment claiming that the PSTLA granted 
them immunity from punitive damages.
103
 After the trial court denied 




The appellate court ruled that the boards were entitled to immunity 
from the tortious interference with contracts claim.
105
 The PSTLA 
generally provided that political subdivisions were immune from acts 
or omissions related to governmental functions.
106
 The act specifically 
defined “the provision of a system of education” as a governmental 
function.
107
 Consequently, charter school boards were entitled to 
immunity even though the charter schools were privately managed.
108
 
Further, ICM’s allegation of tortious interference did not fall within 
the exceptions established by the tort liability statute, which applied 
“only to allegations of negligent acts or when civil liability is 
expressly imposed upon the political subdivision by statute.”
109
 
Conversely, the court ruled that Haynes and Stubbs were not immune 
to liability from the tortious interference with contracts claim.
110
 The 
court reached this conclusion because ICM had claimed that the two 




With respect to the punitive damages claim, the court found that 
the boards were immune because the PSTLA explicitly prohibited 
punitive damages against political subdivisions.
112
 ICM had alleged 
                                                        
101
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that Haynes and Stubbs acted with malicious purpose and in bad 
faith.
113
 Thus, the claim for punitive damages against these board 
members was in their individual capacity instead of their official 
capacity.
114
 Because ICM alleged that Haynes and Stubbs had acted 




C. Educational Management Organizations and Their 
Employees 
In Cunningham v. Star Academy of Toledo, an Ohio appellate court 
examined whether an Educational Management Organization (EMO) 
providing services to a charter school and the principal, who was 
employed by the EMO, were entitled to immunity under the 
PSTLA.
116
 A student attending that charter school was severely injured 
when a television fell on him.
117
 The student’s mother sued 
Constellation LLC, the EMO that was providing management for the 
day-to-day activities of the school.
118
 The mother also sued the 
principal, who had been hired by Constellation.
119
 Both Constellation 
and the principal moved for summary judgment on the grounds that 
they were entitled to immunity.
120
 A state trial court denied 
Constellation’s motion because it was not a political subdivision under 
the statute.
121
 It denied the principal’s motion because he was an 




The defendants then appealed.
123
 The appellate court upheld the 
denials of summary judgment because Constellation was not a political 








 Cunningham v. Star Acad. of Toledo, No. L-12-1272, 2014 WL 523196 (Ohio 
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subdivision.
124
 For purposes of immunity, the Political Subdivision 
Tort Liability Act defined “political subdivision” as “a municipal 
corporation, township, county, school district or other body corporate 
and politic responsible for governmental activities in a geographic area 
other than the state.”
125
 While the statute explicitly identified charter 
schools as political subdivisions, it did not include EMOs.
126
 Also, 
EMOs failed to qualify as a “body corporate and politic” because the 
courts had defined this term to cover public organizations and public 
corporations instead of private, for-profit corporations.
127
 If the state 
legislature had wanted to provide charter school management 
organizations with immunity, the court stated that it would have 
explicitly listed these entities as political subdivisions.
128
 
III: PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 
Recently, a number of high-profile exposés have claimed that 
charter schools are not sufficiently accountable to the public. For 
example, an investigative report by the Detroit Free Press claimed that 
Michigan spent $1 billion on charter schools, but provided insufficient 
oversight over these schools.
129
 Further, according to a study of 
Pennsylvania’s charter schools, the state’s charter operators had 
engaged in fraud and abuse totaling $30 million intended for the 
state’s students, and state oversight agencies needed to increase 
staffing in order to uncover and eliminate fraud.
130
 The Annenberg 
Institute at Brown University issued a report calling for charter schools 
to be subject to the same process and transparency rules as traditional 
                                                        
124
 Id. at *5. 
125
 Id. at *2. 
126
 Id. at *3. 
127
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128
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 CTR. FOR POPULAR DEMOC., ET AL., FRAUD AND FINANCIAL MISMANAGEMENT 
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public schools.
131
 However, charter schools, charter school officials, 
and EMOs have challenged attempts to hold them to heightened 
accountability standards.
 
As a result, state judiciaries have been forced 
to define the legal status of these entities and individuals.
132
 This part 
summarizes the case law on the status of charter schools with respect 
to public accountability statutes. 
A. Ethics Laws 
In New Hope Academy Charter School v. School District of City of 
York, the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court upheld an agency’s 
finding that the board of trustees of a charter school violated the state’s 
Ethics Act in its contracts with the business of the school’s founder.
133
 
This statute prohibited public officials from entering into any contract 
of $500 or more with a governmental body with which the official was 
associated unless the contract was awarded though a public process.
134
 
The court rejected the argument that the contracts were outside the 
scope of the Ethics Act because the charter school’s founder was not a 
“public official.”
135
 The charter school statute stated that school 
administrators were public officials for purposes of the ethics 
statute.
136
 This term included “the chief executive officer of a charter 
school and all other employees of a charter school who by virtue of 
their positions exercise management or operational oversight 
responsibilities.”
137
 The charter school’s founder qualified as an 
administrator and thus was a “public official” because the charter 
formally designated him to be the founder during the period in which 
the unethical behavior had occurred.
138
 Also, the charter school’s tax 
                                                        
131
 ANNENBURG INST. FOR SCH. REF., PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY FOR CHARTER 
SCHOOLS: STANDARDS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE 
OVERSIGHT 5 (2014), available at http://annenberginstitute.org/sites/default/files
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filings listed the founder as its principal officer and managing director 
during the period in question.
139
 
B. Freedom of Information Laws 
In Zager v. Chester Community Charter School,
140
 the Supreme 
Court of Pennsylvania held that charter schools were “agencies” 
subject to the state’s Right-to-Know Act. The statute defined agencies 
that were required to disclose records in the following manner: 
“Agency.” Any office, department, board or commission of the 
executive branch of the Commonwealth, any political subdivision 
of the Commonwealth, the Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission, 
the State System of Higher Education or any State or municipal 
authority or similar organization created by or pursuant to a statute 
which declares in substance that such organization performs or has 




Although the Right-to-Know Act did not specifically list charter 
schools in the definition of “agency,” the statute included a catch-all 
provision that included organizations that performed an essential 
governmental function.
142
 The court found that charter schools were 
agencies under this definition because they performed the essential 
governmental function of education.
143
 The state constitution made it 
clear that education was an indispensable governmental service.
144
 
Also, the Charter School Law (CSL) defined charter schools as 
independent public schools that were designed to provide this essential 
government function in a constitutional manner.
145
 
The court denied the assertion that the CSL did not require charter 
schools to comply with the Right-to-Know Act.
146
 The CSL identified 
only the charter appeal board as being subject to the requirements of 
the Right-to-Know Act.
147
 Another section of the CSL required the 
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141
 Id. at 1230-31. 
142











260 UMass Law Review v. 10 | 240 
charter school board of trustees to comply with the state’s Sunshine 
Act.
148
 The charter school claimed that these two sections 
demonstrated the legislature’s intent to exclude charter schools from 
the requirements of the Right-to-Know Act by limiting compliance to 
the charter appeal board.
149
 The court rejected this argument because 
“charter schools in general are subject to the Act’s requirements by 
virtue of their function of providing the essential, constitutionally 
mandated service of education.”
150
 In addition, because the Right-to-
Know Act predated the CSL by forty years, the court presumed that 
the legislature was aware that charter schools would have to comply 
with the Right-to-Know Act.
151
 For this reason, the court determined 
that the legislature may have declined to reference the Right-to-Know 
Act in the CSL, or to specifically include charter schools within the 




In Chester Community Charter School v. Hardy, the Pennsylvania 
courts are grappling with the question of whether the records of an 
EMO that contracted with a charter school were subject to the Right-
to-Know Act.
153
 A newspaper reporter asked the charter school to 
produce several salary and contract documents.
154
 The charter school 
responded by letter that it was refusing the request because, inter alia, 
many of the materials were outside of the scope of the Right-to-Know 
Act.
155
 The Office of Open Records (OOR) directed the charter school 
to provide the documents.
156
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The charter school appealed to the Commonwealth Court.
158
 It 
claimed, inter alia, that the documents possessed by the EMO were 
not public records.
159
 The court held that the charter school waived this 
argument because it failed to describe the records requested, or cite to 
legal authority, as required by the Right-to-Know Act.
160
 The court 
went on to conclude that the EMO’s business records were subject to 
the statute.
161
 The Right-to-Know Act contained a section that 
addressed public records that were in the custody of a private entity. 
This section stated, in pertinent part, that: 
A public record that is not in the possession of an agency but is in 
the possession of a party with whom the agency has contracted to 
perform a governmental function on behalf of the agency, and 
which directly relates to the governmental function and is not 
exempt under this act, shall be considered a public record of the 
agency for purposes of this act.
162
 
Because charter schools performed the governmental function of 
educating children, the court found that the private entity’s 
management records were related to this function.
163
 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania vacated the decision and 
remanded the case.
164
 On remand, it directed the appellate court to 
decide whether the charter school had waived its right to deny the 
request to produce specific documents in subsequent appeals to the 
Office of Open Records and the courts when it failed to specify these 
documents in the initial letter to the requester.
165
 
C. Accountability for Public Funds and Property 
Two Ohio cases have examined whether charter schools and 
EMOs are accountable for public educational funds and property 
purchased with such funds. In Cordray v. International Preparatory 
School, the Supreme Court of Ohio analyzed whether the treasurer of a 
charter school was a public official who could be strictly liable to the 
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state for public funds lost when the school accepted money to which it 
was not entitled.
166
 A state audit found that a closed charter school had 
received more than $1.4 million in overpayments from the state 
department of education.
167
 The Ohio Attorney General brought action 
against the treasurer of the non-profit corporation that operated the 
charter school, under a state statute that authorized the attorney general 
to retrieve misappropriated funds.
168
 
The state supreme court ruled that the treasurer was a public 
official who was liable for misappropriated funding.
169
 It was well 
settled under state law that public officials were strictly liable for 
public funding.
170
 The crucial question was whether the treasurer of a 
charter school was a “public official.”
171
 The court concluded in the 
affirmative because charter schools were “public offices” under state 
law.
172
 Charter schools fell within the definition of public office 
because the legislature created them to be part of Ohio’s 
constitutionally required system of public schools.
173
 
In Hope Academy Broadway Campus v. White Hat Management, 
the Supreme Court of Ohio will contemplate whether EMOs have a 
fiduciary duty to charter schools that entitles the schools to all property 
that the EMOs have purchased with public funds.
174
 Several charter 
schools entered into management contracts with EMOs owned by 
White Hat Management.
175
 The schools paid White Hat a “continuing 
fee,” consisting of a fixed percentage of the per-pupil funding they 
received from the state.
176
 White Hat used the funds to purchase 
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furniture, computers, books and other equipment for the day-to-day 
operations of the schools.
177
 
The charter schools claimed in trial court that the contracts created 
a formal general fiduciary duty requiring White Hat to give the 
property to the schools without compensation.
178
 The trial court found 
that the agreements did not create a general fiduciary relationship 
because the parties had negotiated at arm’s length, and the contracts 
specifically provided that they did not create a joint venture between 
the parties.
179
 On appeal, the schools contended that White Hat was 
barred from taking title to the property, even if the schools had the 
authority to convey it, because White Hat was a public official and a 
fiduciary that could not use its position for private benefit.
180
 The 
appellate court disagreed because White Hat’s gain was not due to 
some form of financial misconduct.
181
 Rather, the corporation obtained 
this benefit from the expenditure of its own income derived from 
formerly public funds.
182
 In addition, the schools provided no evidence 
showing that White Hat had entered into a mutually beneficial 
relationship with the schools.
183
 As noted above, the Supreme Court is 
reviewing the decision on appeal. 
IV: PREVAILING WAGE STATUTES 
Prevailing wage statutes “require that workers on public works 
projects be paid wages prevailing in the locality.”
184
 In New York 
Charter School Association v. Smith, the Court of Appeals of New 
York held that the state commissioner of education could not issue a 
blanket rule subjecting all charter school projects to the prevailing 
wage statute.
185
 The court disagreed with the commissioner’s claim 
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that the prevailing wage statute applied to charter schools in this case 
because they were public entities that were party to a contract 
“involving the employment of laborers, workmen or mechanics.”
186
 
The law specifically identified only four entities subject to its 
provisions: the state, public benefit corporations, municipal 
corporations, and commissions appointed under law.
187
 Because the 
prevailing wage statute specifically excluded educational corporations, 




The court acknowledged that charter schools had some 
characteristics of public entities because “[t]he legislature designated 
them as ‘independent and autonomous public school[s],’ and granted 
them powers that ‘constitute the performance of essential public 
purposes.’”
189
 Nevertheless, charter schools were different from the 
other public entities identified under the prevailing wage law because a 
self-selected board of trustees, with final say over policy and 
operational matters, governed them instead of governmental 
appointees.
190
 Also, charter schools were exempt from all state and 
local laws governing public schools unless the legislature specifically 
stated otherwise.
191
 “While charter schools are a hybrid of sorts and 
operate on different models,” the court observed, “they are 
significantly less ‘public’ than the entities in those four categories, and 
thus, it is clear that these charter schools do not fall within any of the 
four categories to which the prevailing wage law applies.”
192
 
The court rejected the argument that the charter schools had 
entered into a contract involving workers because they were third-
party intermediaries acting on behalf of the state or the Board of 
Regents.
193
 The commissioner based this assertion on an amendment 
to the wage law that applied its requirements to private parties that 
                                                        
186
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 Id. at 525-26. 
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carried out public works projects on behalf of public owners.
194
 The 
court found that neither the legislative history of the prevailing wage 
statute nor the amendment indicated that charter schools were 
included.
195
 Additionally, the charter schools had to secure resources 
for building projects on their own and assumed the risks associated 
with these projects.
196
 Because the renovation contracts were solely for 




The court cautioned that its holding did not exempt every contract 
in which the charter school was a party to the prevailing wage statute 
because there may be instances in which charter schools were acting 
on behalf of a public entity.
198
 However, the court did not need to 
address whether the prevailing wage statute applied to those situations 
because the facilities projects in the Smith case consisted of projects in 
which the charter school or the foundations supporting the charter 
schools owned the buildings, and the charter schools assumed the 




V: STUDENT DISCIPLINE 
The final issue that this Article addresses is student discipline. In 
Goss v. Lopez, the Supreme Court ruled that public school students 
subjected to suspensions of ten or fewer days were entitled to due 
process.
200
 A student facing such a suspension had a right to “be given 
oral and written notice of the charges against him and, if he denies 
them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an 
opportunity to present his side of the story.”
201
 The Goss Court also 
observed that “longer suspensions or expulsions for the remainder of 
the school term, or permanently, may require more formal 
                                                        
194
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procedures.”
202
 States have implemented due process requirements for 
suspensions and expulsions that public schools must follow in 
response to the Goss decision.
203
 By contrast, most state statutes 
exempt charter schools from school district discipline policies, instead 
allowing charter schools to devise their own policies subject to the 
approval of its authorizing authority.
204
 
In Scott B. v. Board of Trustees of Orange High School of Arts, a 
California appellate court ruled that public school student expulsion 
requirements did not apply to charter school dismissals because of 
their different legal status.
205
 In this case, a charter school dismissed a 
student for bringing a knife to school.
206
 The school’s Board of 
Trustees upheld the dismissal in a one-sentence letter.
207
 The student 
alleged that the charter school violated the state’s education code by 
failing to provide him with an evidentiary hearing prior to his 
expulsion.
208
 The student also claimed that the Board failed to set forth 
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The appellate court denied the student’s claim, stating that the 
code’s expulsion statute did not apply to charter schools.
210
 The court 
observed that the education code generally exempted charter schools 
from the laws governing school districts with several exceptions.
211
 
Moreover, the expulsion statute was not included in the exceptions.
212
 
The court also distinguished between expulsions from public schools 
and dismissals from charter schools. Students who had been expelled 
from public schools were generally required to complete the term of 
their expulsions.
213
 Such time away from school resulted in delays that 
impinged on students’ legitimate interest in an education.
214
 Charter 
school dismissals did not raise such concerns because they were 
“schools of choice” that students were not required to attend.
215
 When 
a charter school dismissed a student, he or she was free to enroll in 
another school with no loss of class time.
216
 Therefore, charter school 




VI: ANALYSIS OF HOW COURTS HAVE TREATED THE STATUS OF 
CHARTER SCHOOLS, CHARTER SCHOOL OFFICIALS, AND 
EDUCATIONAL MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
The previous parts of this Article have analyzed whether charter 
schools are public with respect to four areas of state statutory law: (1) 
governmental immunity; (2) public accountability; (3) prevailing wage 
laws; and (4) student discipline. In these cases, courts have examined 
how these laws apply to charter schools, charter school officials, and 
the Educational Management Organizations (EMOs) that provide 
educational services to charter schools. This part summarizes the 
holdings of the courts with respect to these groups. 
                                                        
210
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A. Are Charter Schools Public Entities That Should Be 
Subject to the Same Treatment As  Other Public Entities? 
In six cases discussed in this Article, courts addressed whether 
charter schools were public entities that should be subject to the same 
treatment as other public entities. In three cases, the courts answered 
this question in the affirmative. In two cases, King v. United States,
218
 
and Zager v. Community Charter School,
219
 the courts found that 
charter schools were entitled to the same treatment as governmental 
entities because charter school statutes declared that they were 
carrying out the governmental function of education. However, in 
Warner v. Lawrence, a Pennsylvania appellate court ruled that charter 
schools were entitled to immunity because the Charter School Law 
made it clear that charter schools would be treated in the same manner 
as other political subdivisions, while providing protection from 
liability to local school directors from the actions of charter schools or 
their boards of trustees.
220
 
In three cases, the courts held that charter schools were not public 
entities under state statutes. At first glance, there appears to be no 
unifying theme for these cases. In Wells v. One2One Learning 
Foundation, the Supreme Court of California rejected the argument 
that charter schools should be entitled to immunity from the state’s 
false claims and unfair competition statutes because they were a part 
of the public school system.
221
 The court found that the charter schools 
were “persons” under these statutes that were not entitled to immunity 
because they were operated by non-profit corporations that had 
substantial freedom from the requirements to which school districts 
were subject.
222
 In New York Charter School Association v. Smith, the 
Court of Appeals of New York found that charter schools were not 
public entities under the state prevailing wage statute because: (1) the 
law specifically excluded educational corporations
223
 and (2) charter 
schools were less “public” than the other entities that were specifically 
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beholden to the statute.
224
 In Scott B. v. Board of Trustees of Orange 
High School of Arts, a California appellate court held that charter 
schools were not subject to the same student expulsion requirements as 
traditional public schools, in part, because the education code’s 
expulsion provision did not apply to charter schools.
225
 The court also 
distinguished between expulsions from traditional public schools and 
dismissals from charter schools because charter schools were “schools 
of choice.”
226
 Students could attend other schools upon being 
dismissed from charter schools without loss of class time.
227
 
In summary, the courts used the same reasoning to reach its 
conclusion in only two of the six cases. While these cases may seem 
very different at first glance, upon closer inspection, there appears to 
be an overarching theme. In each case, the court reached its holding 




B.  Are Charter School Officials Public Officials? 
In three cases, discussed above in this Article, courts concluded 
that charter school officials were public officials who were subject to 
the same treatment as other public officials. In Hope Academy 
Broadway Campus v. Integrated Consulting and Management, an 
Ohio appellate court ruled that a charter school board was immune 
from suit, in part, because charter schools were performing a 
governmental function entitling them to governmental immunity under 
the state tort liability statute.
229
 In Cordray v. International 
Preparatory School, the Supreme Court of Ohio held that a charter 
school treasurer was a public official who was strictly liable for 
governmental overpayments because charter schools were “public 
offices” under state law.
230
 In New Hope Academy Charter School v. 
School District of City of York, a Pennsylvania appellate court held 
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that a charter school’s founder was a public official under the state’s 
ethics statute because the charter school statute declared that school 
administrators were public officials under the ethics law.
231
 Thus, in all 
three of these decisions, the court looked to the statutory language to 
determine whether charter school officials were public officials, 
subject to the same treatment as other public officials. 
C. Are Educational Management Organizations Public 
Entities? 
In three cases surveyed in this Article, courts have analyzed 
whether EMOs are public entities subject to the requirements or 
protections afforded to other public entities. In Cunningham v. Star 
Academy of Toledo, an Ohio appellate court held that an EMO that 
was providing day-to-day management services for a charter school 
and the principal whom it hired were not entitled to governmental 
immunity under the state’s tort liability act.
232
 The court determined: 
(1) the statute did not identify EMOs as political subdivisions that 
were entitled to immunity and (2) charter schools did not qualify as 
“bodies corporate and politic” under the statute because the courts had 
defined this term to cover only public organizations.
233
 
In Hope Academy Broadway Campus v. White Hat Management, 
an Ohio appellate court held that an EMO was not a public official 
with a fiduciary duty to return property to charter schools.
234
 The court 
reached this conclusion because the corporation obtained the property 
from its own income derived from formerly public funds.
235
 The Ohio 
Supreme Court is reviewing this decision on appeal.
236
 
By contrast, in Chester Community Charter School v Hardy, a 
Pennsylvania appellate court ruled that charter school business records 
in the possession of an EMO were public records under the state’s 
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Right-to-Know Act.
237
 The court reached this conclusion because of a 
provision that subjected such records to the Act’s requirements as long 
as they were related to a governmental function.
238
 The Supreme Court 
of Pennsylvania remanded the case to determine whether the charter 
school had waived its right to deny a request to produce specific 
documents in subsequent appeals when it failed to specify these 
documents to the initial requester.
239
 Once again, in all three cases, the 
court looked to the language of the pertinent statutes to determine 
whether EMOs were public entities. 
VII: AREAS OF CONCERN THAT MIGHT WARRANT FUTURE 
LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS 
From our review of the charter school, public-status case law, we 
find that courts primarily look to the language of pertinent statutory 
provisions. Therefore legislatures should clarify their intentions with 
respect to charter schools, charter school officials, and EMOs. We 
have identified two areas that are especially concerning and may 
warrant future legislative amendments.
240
 One area is the fiduciary 
obligations of EMOs. Legislators should be especially concerned 
about the implications of the Hope Academy Broadway Campus case. 
In this case, the Supreme Court of Ohio is contemplating whether to 
affirm an appellate court’s ruling that an EMO had a fiduciary duty to 
return property purchased with public funds to the charter schools that 
it was managing. Although White Hat Management, the EMO litigant 
in this case, received $90 million in public funds to run the charter 
school plaintiffs in this case, the EMO’s attorney declared in oral 
argument that they were not public officials.
241
 The attorney also 
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claimed that the state had never chosen to treat EMOs as public 




This position is disturbing, especially in light of the fact that the 
Ohio legislature has a constitutional duty to provide a “thorough and 
efficient system of common schools.”
243
 One wonders whether a 
system that allows EMOs to abscond with millions of dollars of 
publically funded school equipment is truly “efficient.” Regardless of 
how the Supreme Court of Ohio rules on this matter, state legislatures 
should at the very least designate that property purchased with public 
funding remain the property of the charter school. Such an amendment 
would be consistent with the advice of the National Association of 
Charter School Authorizers (NACSA) for contracts between charter 
schools and EMOs.
244
 Specifically, NACSA advises that all contracts 
between charter schools and EMOs include a provision that 
“[r]equire[s] all instructional materials, furnishings, and equipment 
purchased or developed with public funds to be the property of the 
school, not the third party.”
245
 We suggest that legislators incorporate 
this language into their charter school legislation. 
The other area of concern is student expulsions and dismissals. In 
Scott B., a California appellate court held that dismissals from charter 
schools, which were designated as “schools of choice,” did not 
interfere with a student’s property right to an education because 
students could immediately return to a district’s public schools.
246
 
Soon after the Scott B. decision, a federal district court in Hawaii held 
in Lindsey v. Matayoshi
247
 that a charter school did not have to provide 
a due process hearing to a student expelled from a charter school under 
the Due Process Clause because the child could return to a public 
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The belief expressed in Scott B. and the Matayoshi decisions that a 
dismissed charter school student can immediately enroll in a 
traditional public school has not always been supported by reality.
249
 
The California Department of Education has instructed school districts 
that they may treat students expelled from charter schools in the same 
manner as children expelled from a school district.
250
 The San Diego 
County Department of Education has advised school officials to 
review removals from charter schools to determine whether a school 
district would have expelled the student.
251
 If the district would have 
acted in the same manner, the agency has advised the district to enroll 
the child in an alternative school, thus depriving students from 
attending traditional public schools.
252
 Therefore, legislators should 
consider amending their charter school statutes to require these schools 
to comply with public school, due process provisions. 
Legislators should also think about how courts might analyze 
expulsion and dismissal cases in school districts that are converting 
their traditional public schools to charter schools. In December 2013, 
New Orleans announced that it would become the nation’s first all-
charter school district in September 2014.
253
 Similarly, in December 
2014, a Pennsylvania trial court judge ruled that the state would take 
over the York City School District.
254
 The court-appointed recovery 
officer plans to convert all of York’s schools into charter schools.
255
 
The advent of all-charter districts gives rise to the following questions: 
(1) What are the due process rights of students who are dismissed or 
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expelled from charter schools in these districts?; and (2) What happens 
if other charter schools in these districts refuse to enroll a dismissed or 
expelled student because of their “school of choice” status? 
A federal circuit court case, Logiodice v. Trustees of Maine 
Central Institute,
256
 suggests that students in all-charter districts might 
not have due process protection from dismissals or expulsions. This 
case also suggests that other charter schools may not have to accept 
these students. In this case, a Maine school district had contracted with 
a private school to educate its high-school-age students at public 
expense.
257
 A student attending the school claimed that the school 
violated his due process rights by suspending him for seventeen days 
without a hearing.
258
 According to the contract, the school’s board of 
trustees had sole authority over school disciplinary matters.
259
 
The First Circuit ruled that the private school did not have to 
provide due process in suspending the student because the school was 
not a state actor under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal statute that 
establishes a cause of action for deprivations of federal constitutional 
and statutory rights under the color of state law.
260
 The First Circuit 
acknowledged that it could create an ad hoc exception that would 
require the private school to provide due process because “Maine has 
undertaken in its Constitution and statutes to assure secondary 
education to all school-aged children.”
261
 Further, the private school 
was “for those in the community the only regular education available 
for which the state will pay.”
262
 Another significant consideration was 
that while “[a] school teacher dismissed by a private school without 
due process is likely to have other options for employment[,] a student 
wrongly expelled from the only free secondary education in town is in 
far more trouble,”
263
 However, to make an exception, the court had to 
be convinced that “the threat is serious, reasonably wide-spread, and 
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without alternative means of redress.”
264
 The court concluded that 
“[n]one of these elements is satisfied in this case.”
265
 
One reason for this conclusion was that state law required the 
school district to provide the child with a free secondary education.
266
 
If the private school had wrongly expelled the student, the school 
district could still be required to educate him.
267
 While this solution 
would be problematic in this case because the school district so 
heavily relied on the private school to provide an education, it was 
likely that “a Maine court would compel the school district to satisfy 
its obligation by providing him an education.”
268
 
The analysis in Logiodice suggests that a state court might find that 
students who are expelled from schools in all-charter districts might 
not have a property right to due process. Also, students may not be 
able to compel other charter schools in those districts to enroll them. 
Schools in all-charter districts might successfully argue that the state 
can satisfy a student’s property right to an education under state law by 
providing that child with other educational options, such as alternative 
schools. Legislators should consider whether such a scenario is 
acceptable. 
VIII: CONCLUSION 
This Article has explored how courts have determined whether 
charter schools, charter school officials, and EMOs are “public” under 
state statutory provisions. Our review of the case law focused on four 
statutory categories: (1) governmental immunity; (2) public 
accountability; (3) prevailing wages; and (4) student discipline. Six 
cases addressed whether charter schools were public entities subject to 
the same treatment as other public entities. In three of these cases, 
courts answered this question in the affirmative. In three cases, courts 
addressed whether charter school officials were public officials who 
were subject to the same treatment as other public officials. All three 
cases answered this question in the affirmative. Finally, in three cases 
surveyed in this Article, a court analyzed whether EMOs are public 
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entities subject to the same treatment as other public entities. One case 
answered this question in the affirmative. In all of the cases surveyed 
in this Article, the courts based their conclusion on the pertinent 
statutory language. 
From this review, we suggest that legislatures should consider 
amending their student discipline and EMO fiduciary requirements to 
be more aligned with the requirements that apply to public schools. 
 
